


# PROTEGO® - Excellence in Safety and Environment

## Flame Arresters Technology and Maintenance

Dr. Michael Davies, Hussam Al-Qahtani, Dr. Thomas Hembach 08/10/2025



# Flame Arrester Basics




A device fitted to the opening of an enclosure or to the connecting pipe work of a system of enclosures and whose intended function is to allow flow but prevent transmission of flame.

**Protected side**




**Unprotected side**

# Stopping Flame Propagation




# Flame Arrester Applications – Why do we need them?



- Storage Tanks / Tank Farms
- Process Equipment
- Vapor Combustors / Flares
- Ship Loading Systems
- Vapor Recovery Units
- Specialized equipment (ex. blowers)

# International Standard ISO 16852







# Example of a detonation propagating through a pipe



# In Line Deflagration, Unstable & Stable Detonation




# MAXIMUM EXPERIMENTAL SAFE GAP





# Critical Factor: MESG Value



Substance	MIE (mJ)	MESG (mm)	
Carbon-disulphide	0,009	0,34	II C
Hyrdogene	0,016	0,29	
Acetylene	0,019	0,37	
Ethylene	0,082	0,65	II B
Diethylether	0,19	0,87	
n-Propanol		0,87	
Methane	0,28	1,14	II A
Propane	0,25	0,92	
n-Butane	0,25	0,98	
n-Hexane	0,24	0,93	
n-Heptane	0,24	0,91	
Methanol	0,14	0,92	
Ammonia	14,0	3,17	




Fig. 3: Sectional model of the MESG-device.




Conservation Vents & Flame Arresters

# **In-Line Deflagration**

**DN 1000**

**6,6 vol% Ethylene in Air**

# Critical Factor: Process Temperature



# Critical Factor: Process Temperature





# Layer of Protection Concept (ISO 16852, NFPA 69, PD CEN/TR 16793:2016)



- When designing overall safety concepts one has to take account of:
- The likelihood of adverse events (e.g. flame transmission from ignition source)
  - The extent of the consequences

Ignition Source	Explosive Atmosphere			
	permanent	sometimes	rare	never (non-harazardous area)
permanent	3	2	1	0
sometimes	2	1	0	-
rare	1	0	-	-
never	0	-	-	-


Number of independent measures against flame transmission

# Examples of applying flame arrester to the process



- Combustion of vapor from chemical process and storage


Explosion proof breather valve




Detonation Arrester with combined breather valve

In-Line Deflagration Arrester

Velocity Loop



# Please keep in mind that accidents do occur!



**Wrong material was used for this application. An Aluminium housing may not be the best choice in an area of high likelihood for endurance burning**



# If standards are followed accidents can be prevented



**Stainless steel or carbon steel are a much better choice. When ever endurance burning can occur. Don't forget the temperature sensor and the measures to quench the flame!**



# Incorrect Installations





# Incorrect Installations




Maintenance shall only be done under strict observation of the relevant safety instructions. **Only trained experts** shall do the maintenance. Generally maintenance should only be done, if the tank or the part of plant is not under pressure and neither filled nor emptied.





# OEM Parts should be used – Welded Fusible Element



- Inspection for damage or signs of flashback
- Clean arresters will allow equipment like flares/oxidizers/VRUs to function properly and prevent unit shutdown or flashback
- Preventative Maintenance and thorough cleaning will extend the lifespan of the arrester
- Clean arresters are more effective at preventing flame propagation and standing flames
- small pressure drop results in low energy consumption

## What risks your safety?


1. Corrosion of flame arrester discs
2. Mistakes/ Damages during maintenance, assembly, installations
3. Too many explosions  
(inspection intervals too long , wrong process design)



## **Risk 1:**

# **Corrosion**

# Flame Arrester Basics – How They Work





# Damaged flame arresting unit (product: battery acid ) regular servicing failed!



supplied 1992 – customer complaint 2010



# Corroded Flamefilter (pitting): Replacement!






# Corrosion at a Detonation FA



DR/ES-shock absorber – 3 years operation without servicing Oil and Gas producing operation





DR/ES: Installation 2006 / first servicing 2010 – Manufacturer of cleaning agents



**Risk 2:**


**Damages / Mistakes**

# Example of Damaged Flame Arrester Unit (FAU)






# Transport damage: mechanically destroyed Flamefilter



## Risk 3: too many Explosions




Risk 3 can be caused by:

- Inspection intervall is too long
- Wrong process design (e.g. pressure drop issue, wrong material)



# Annealing colours caused by endurance burning



## **Reduction of risk1 - Corrosion:**

**First inspection after a few weeks, in case of corrosion, change material!**

**Later minimum 1 inspection per year!**

## **Reduction of risk2 - Damages / Mistakes**

**Read Instruction Manual carefully! Let trained technicians do the job!**

**Contract experienced companies e.g. PARC!**

**Join Maintenance Seminars at PROTEGO!**

## **Reduction of risk3 - too many Explosions:**

**First inspection after a few weeks, in case of explosion signs change safety concept!**

**Later minimum 1 inspection per year!**

# Maintenance of flame arrester in acc. to NFPA 69



**N 15.7.2 Static Dry Flame Arrester Systems.** Arrester systems shall be designed to allow inspection for product buildup on a frequency established by facility experience.

**N 15.7.2.1** Initially, until experience has determined otherwise, the unit shall be inspected based on manufacturer's recommendations.

**N 15.7.2.2** Design shall allow internal inspection of flame filter elements.

**N 15.7.2.3** If exposed to corrosive media, filter elements shall be designed so that they can be removed for inspection.

**Reason for  
Filter Disk Design**






# Flame arresting section common in the industry



welded






# Easy inspection of the FA



Inspection of FA unit by folding out of the unit and cleaning by compressed air.  
But in case of any doubts: dismantle the flame arresting unit and check the correct sequence of flamefilter



## Fouling, Clogging, Condensate

**In venting line: Safety topic**

**In process line: Efficiency topic and safety topic**

**Fouling, Clogging, Condensate is not problem for explosion protection  
but for free gas flow.**



# Fouling





# Accumulation of condensate blocks the flow through the Detonation FA





# Clogging caused by corrosion of pipeline material





# Polymerization plugs the gaps of the flamefilter



In case of **Fouling, Clogging, Condensat:**


## **Short cleaning intervals**

**May be a change in process design could help:**


- Insulation or heating of flame arrester (in accordance with approval temperature),
- other flame arrester design, e.g. special maintenance friendly design or different flame filter element material
- nitrogen blanketing of tank



Standard design



Maintenance-friendly design



*FLAMEFILTER® and O-rings prevent contamination and an explosive atmosphere.*

In case of **Fouling, Clogging, Condensat:**

**How can cleaning be conducted?**

# Maintenance of the Flamefilter with pressurized hot water







- Cleaning of flame arrester is possible with:
  - **Compressed air**
  - **Hot water, steam**
  - **Solvents**
  - **Ultrasonic cleaning – follow PROTEGO requirements**
- **NO metall brush!**

# Bethune Point - Methanol Tank Explosion – Hot Work Incident



## The Incident

- January 11, 2006
- Methanol Tank Explosion and Fire
- Two Workers Died
- One Worker Critically Injured



## Key Findings

- Severely Corroded Flame Arrester
- Improper Use of Plastic Piping
- Ineffective Safety Programs





# Bethune Point - Methanol Tank Explosion – Hot Work Incident



## Flame Arrester

- Flame arrester was made of aluminum
- Methanol is known to corrode aluminum
- City unaware of the need to clean & inspect
- Flame arrester was not cleaned or inspected since its installation in 1993





Figure 3. Bethune Point WWTP safety related training sessions.




# Explosion hazard of methanol storage



Source: Conference: Society of Risk Analysis, Annual meeting 9/2006 – Hedlund/Andersen - EU's MARS Methanol / Ethanol Research

# Temperature distribution - differences between gas phase, liquid and wall temperature





# PROTEGO<sup>®</sup> devices fulfill their tasks!



NEWS

## Business as usual at Carbery plant after fire

SEPTEMBER 10TH, 2016 11:55 AM  
BY SOUTHERN STAR TEAM



The fire on Sunday evening at the Carbery plant. (Photo: George Chambers)

**Flame arrester returned to the factory after the incident!**





# End-of-line flame arrester during endurance burning test



- **MESG Value of Methanol is 0.92 mm**
- **hexane vapor test as per ISO 16852/IEC 80079-49 is not sufficient**
- **read the test standard carefully**
- **special testing with alcohol vapor is required for endurance burning**



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